Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/453

Key Replacement Attack on a Certificateless Signature Scheme

Zhenfeng Zhang and Dengguo Feng

Abstract: Yap, Heng and Goi propose an efficient certificateless signature scheme based on the intractability of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, and prove that the scheme is secure in the random oracle model. This paper shows that their certificateless signature scheme is vulnerable to key replacement attacks, where an adversary who replaces the public key of a signer can forge valid signatures on any messages for that signer without knowing the signer's private key.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / digital signatures

Publication Info: No

Date: received 30 Nov 2006

Contact author: zfzhang at is iscas ac cn

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20061204:103047 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2006/453

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