Key Replacement Attack on a Certificateless Signature Scheme

Zhenfeng Zhang; Dengguo Feng

Paper 2006/453

Key Replacement Attack on a Certificateless Signature Scheme

Zhenfeng Zhang and Dengguo Feng

Abstract

Yap, Heng and Goi propose an efficient certificateless signature scheme based on the intractability of the computational Diffie-Hellman problem, and prove that the scheme is secure in the random oracle model. This paper shows that their certificateless signature scheme is vulnerable to key replacement attacks, where an adversary who replaces the public key of a signer can forge valid signatures on any messages for that signer without knowing the signer's private key.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. No
Keywords: digital signatures
Contact author(s): zfzhang @ is iscas ac cn
History: 2006-12-04: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2006/453
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/453,
      author = {Zhenfeng Zhang and Dengguo Feng},
      title = {Key Replacement Attack on a Certificateless Signature Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/453},
      year = {2006},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/453}
}