Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/448

Universally Composable and Forward Secure RFID Authentication and Key Exchange

Tri van Le, Mike Burmester, Breno de Medeiros

Abstract: Protocols proven secure in universally composable models remain secure under concurrent and modular composition, and may be easily plugged into more complex protocols without having their security re-assessed with each new use. Recently, a universally composable framework has been proposed for Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) authentication protocols, that simultaneously provides for availability, anonymity, and authenticity. In this paper we extend that framework to support key-compromise and forward-security issues.

We also introduce new, provably secure, and highly practical protocols for anonymous authentication and key-exchange by RFID devices. The new protocols are lightweight, requiring only a pseudo-random bit generator. The new protocols satisfy forward-secure anonymity, authenticity, and availability requirements in the Universal Composability model. The proof exploits pseudo-randomness in the standard model.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols /

Publication Info: RFID Authentication Protocols, key exchange, anonymity, forward security, universal composability

Date: received 27 Nov 2006, last revised 5 Dec 2006

Contact author: levan at cs fsu edu

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Modified section 7.

Version: 20061205:234449 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2006/448

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