Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/447

Towards a Separation of Semantic and CCA Security for Public Key Encryption

Yael Gertner and Tal Malkin and Steven Myers

Abstract: We address the question of whether or not semantically secure public-key encryption primitives imply the existence of chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) secure primitives. We show a black-box separation, using the methodology introduced by Impagliazzo and Rudich, for a large non-trivial class of constructions. In particular, we show that if the proposed CCA construction's decryption algorithm does not query the semantically secure primitive's encryption algorithm, then the proposed construction cannot be CCA secure

Category / Keywords: foundations / Public-Key Encryption, CCA, Semantic Security, Black-Box Separation

Publication Info: To Appear in the proceedings of the Theoretical Cryptography Conference (TCC) 07.

Date: received 27 Nov 2006

Contact author: samyers at indiana edu

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20061204:101957 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2006/447

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