A Generic Construction of CCA-Secure Cryptosystems without NIZKP for a Bounded Number of Decryption Queries

Goichiro Hanaoka; Hideki Imai

Paper 2006/408

A Generic Construction of CCA-Secure Cryptosystems without NIZKP for a Bounded Number of Decryption Queries

Goichiro Hanaoka and Hideki Imai

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a generic construction of chosen-ciphertext secure cryptosystems against adversaries with a bounded number of decrytion queries from arbitrary semantically secure encryption in a black box manner. Our construction is not only an alternative to the previously known technique, i.e. the Naor-Yung paradigm, but also has some interesting properties. Especially, (1) it does not require non-interactive zero-knowledge proof, and (2) its component ciphertexts can be compressed into only one if the underlying encryption has a certain homomorphic property. Consequently, when applying our construction to the ElGamal encryption, ciphertext overhead of the resulting scheme will be only one group element which is considered optimal since it is the same as the original ElGamal. Disadvantages to previous schemes are that the upper bound of the number of decryption queries (e.g. 2^{30}) has to be known before set-up phase, and the size of public key is large.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF PS
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: public key encryption chosen-ciphertext security short ciphertext length
Contact author(s): hanaoka-goichiro @ aist go jp
History: 2006-11-13: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2006/408
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/408,
      author = {Goichiro Hanaoka and Hideki Imai},
      title = {A Generic Construction of {CCA}-Secure Cryptosystems without {NIZKP} for a Bounded Number of Decryption Queries},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/408},
      year = {2006},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/408}
}