Paper 2006/386
The Wrestlers Protocol: A simple, practical, secure, deniable protocol for key-exchange
Mark Wooding
Abstract
We describe and prove (in the random-oracle model) the security of a simple but efficient zero-knowledge identification scheme, whose security is based on the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. Unlike other recent proposals for efficient identification protocols, we don't need any additional assumptions, such as the Knowledge of Exponent assumption. From this beginning, we build a simple key-exchange protocol, and prove that it achieves `SK-security' -- and hence security in Canetti's Universal Composability framework. Finally, we show how to turn the simple key-exchange protocol into a slightly more complex one which provides a number of valuable `real-life' properties, without damaging its security.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- public-key cryptographykey agreementkey exchangedeniabilityzero knowledge
- Contact author(s)
- mdw @ distorted org uk
- History
- 2006-11-03: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/386
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/386,
author = {Mark Wooding},
title = {The Wrestlers Protocol: A simple, practical, secure, deniable protocol for key-exchange},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/386},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/386}
}
