Paper 2006/380
On Security of Sovereign Joins
Einar Mykletun and Gene Tsudik
Abstract
The goal of a sovereign join operation is to compute a query across independent database relations such that nothing beyond the join results is revealed. Each relation involved in a sovereign join is owned by a distinct entity and the party posing the query is distinct from the relation owners; it is not permitted to access the original relations. One notable recent research result proposed a secure technique for executing sovereign joins. It entails data owners sending their relations to an independent database service provider which executes a sovereign join with the aid of a tamper-resistant secure coprocessor. This achieves the goal of preventing information leakage during query execution. However, as we show in this paper, the proposed technique is actually insecure as it fails to prevent an attacker from learning the query results. We also suggest some measures to remedy the security problems.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- applicationsinformation hiding
- Contact author(s)
- gts @ ics uci edu
- History
- 2006-11-03: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/380
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/380,
author = {Einar Mykletun and Gene Tsudik},
title = {On Security of Sovereign Joins},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/380},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/380}
}
