Paper 2006/367
An Attack on a Certificateless Signature Scheme
Xuefei Cao, Kenneth G. Paterson, and Weidong Kou
Abstract
This paper demonstrates that a certificateless signature scheme recently proposed by Gorantla and Saxena is insecure. It is shown that an adversary who replaces the public key of a signer can then forge valid signatures for that signer without knowledge of the signer's private key.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Contact author(s)
- kenny paterson @ rhul ac uk
- History
- 2006-11-03: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/367
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/367, author = {Xuefei Cao and Kenneth G. Paterson and Weidong Kou}, title = {An Attack on a Certificateless Signature Scheme}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/367}, year = {2006}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/367} }