Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of  ARIA and Camellia

Wenling Wu; Wentao Zhang; Dengguo Feng

Paper 2006/350

Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of ARIA and Camellia

Wenling Wu, Wentao Zhang, and Dengguo Feng

Abstract

This paper studies the security of the block ciphers ARIA and Camellia against impossible differential cryptanalysis. Our work improves the best impossible differential cryptanalysis of ARIA and Camellia known so far. The designers of ARIA expected no impossible differentials exist for 4-round ARIA. However, we found some nontrivial 4-round impossible differentials, which may lead to a possible attack on 6-round ARIA. Moreover, we found some nontrivial 8-round impossible differentials for Camellia, whereas only 7-round impossible differentials were previously known. By using the 8-round impossible differentials, we presented an attack on 12-round Camellia without $FL/FL^{-1}$ layers.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s): wwl @ is iscas ac cn
History: 2006-10-20: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2006/350
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/350,
      author = {Wenling Wu and Wentao Zhang and Dengguo Feng},
      title = {Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of  ARIA and Camellia},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2006/350},
      year = {2006},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/350}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/350}
}