Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/346

Generic Transformation to Strongly Unforgeable Signatures

Qiong Huang and Duncan S. Wong and Yiming Zhao

Abstract: Recently, there are several generic transformation techniques proposed for converting unforgeable signature schemes (the message in the forgery has not been signed yet) into strongly unforgeable ones (the message in the forgery could have been signed previously). Most of the techniques are based on trapdoor hash functions and all of them require adding supplementary components onto the original key pair of the signature scheme. In this paper, we propose a new generic transformation which converts \emph{any} unforgeable signature scheme into a strongly unforgeable one, and also keeps the key pair of the signature scheme unchanged. Our technique is based on \emph{strong one-time signature schemes}. We show that they can be constructed efficiently from any one-time signature scheme that is based on one-way functions. The performance of our technique also compares favorably with that of those trapdoor-hash-function-based ones. In addition, this new generic transformation can also be used for attaining strongly unforgeable signature schemes in other cryptographic settings which include certificateless signature, identity-based signature, and several others. To the best of our knowledge, similar extent of versatility is not known to be supported by any of those comparable techniques. Finally and of independent interest, we show that our generic transformation technique can be modified to an \emph{on-line/off-line} signature scheme, which possesses a very efficient signing process.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / digital signatures, strong unforgeability

Publication Info: ACNS 2007

Date: received 13 Oct 2006, last revised 21 Mar 2007

Contact author: csqhuang at cityu edu hk

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Version: 20070321:061734 (All versions of this report)

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