Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/346
Generic Transformation to Strongly Unforgeable Signatures
Qiong Huang and Duncan S. Wong and Yiming Zhao
Abstract: Recently, there are several generic transformation techniques proposed
for converting unforgeable signature schemes (the message in the
forgery has not been signed yet) into strongly unforgeable ones (the
message in the forgery could have been signed previously). Most of the
techniques are based on trapdoor hash functions and all of them require
adding
supplementary components onto the original key pair of the signature
scheme. In this paper, we propose a new generic transformation which
converts \emph{any} unforgeable signature scheme into a strongly
unforgeable one, and also keeps the key pair of the signature scheme
unchanged. Our technique is based on \emph{strong one-time signature
schemes}. We show that they can be constructed efficiently from
any one-time signature scheme that is based on one-way functions.
The performance of our technique also compares favorably
with that of those trapdoor-hash-function-based ones. In addition,
this new generic transformation can also be used for attaining
strongly unforgeable signature schemes in other cryptographic
settings which include certificateless signature, identity-based
signature, and several others. To the best of our knowledge, similar
extent of versatility is not known to be supported by any of those
comparable techniques. Finally and of independent interest, we show
that our generic transformation technique can be modified to an
\emph{on-line/off-line} signature scheme, which possesses a very
efficient signing process.
Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / digital signatures, strong unforgeability
Publication Info: ACNS 2007
Date: received 13 Oct 2006, last revised 21 Mar 2007
Contact author: csqhuang at cityu edu hk
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Note: This is the full version.
Version: 20070321:061734 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2006/346
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