## Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/296

On the Generic Construction of Identity-Based Signatures with Additional Properties

David Galindo and Javier Herranz and Eike Kiltz

Abstract: It has been demonstrated by Bellare, Neven, and Namprempre (Eurocrypt 2004) that identity-based signature schemes can be generically constructed from standard digital signature schemes. In this paper we consider the following natural extension: is there a generic construction of identity-based signature schemes with additional properties'' (such as identity-based blind signatures, verifiably encrypted signatures, ...) from standard signature schemes with the same properties? Our results show that this is possible for a number of properties including proxy signatures; (partially) blind signatures; verifiably encrypted signatures; undeniable signatures; forward-secure signatures; (strongly) key insulated signatures; online/offline signatures; threshold signatures; and (with some limitations) aggregate signatures.

Using well-known results for standard signature schemes, we conclude that explicit identity-based signature schemes with additional properties can be constructed, enjoying sometimes better properties than specific schemes proposed until know. In particular, our work implies the existence of identity-based signatures with additional properties that are provably secure in the standard model, do not need bilinear pairings, or can be based on general assumptions.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Signatures with Additional Properties, Identity-Based Cryptography

Publication Info: An extended abstract of this paper appeared in Advances in Cryptology --- ASIACRYPT '06. This is the extended version, published in: Advances in Mathematics of Communications, Volume 4, Issue 4, pp. 453-483, 2010

Date: received 30 Aug 2006, last revised 24 Nov 2010

Contact author: kiltz at cwi nl

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Short URL: ia.cr/2006/296

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