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Paper 2006/243

Side Channel Attacks and Countermeasures on Pairing Based Cryptosystems over Binary Fields

Tae Hyun Kim, Tsuyoshi Takagi, Dong-Guk Han, Ho Won Kim, and Jongin Lim

Abstract

Pairings on elliptic curves have been used as cryptographic primitives for the development of new applications such as identity based schemes. For the practical applications, it is crucial to provide efficient and secure implementations of the pairings. There have been several works on efficient implementations of the pairings. However, the research for secure implementations of the pairings has not been thoroughly investigated. In this paper, we investigate vulnerability of the pairing used in some pairing based protocols against side channel attacks. We propose an efficient algorithm secure against such side channel attacks of the eta pairing using randomized projective coordinate systems for the pairing computation.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Pairing based cryptosystemsSide channel attacksDifferential Power AnalysisRandomized projective coordinate systemsthe Eta pairing
Contact author(s)
thkim @ cist korea ac kr
History
2006-07-14: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/243
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/243,
      author = {Tae Hyun Kim and Tsuyoshi Takagi and Dong-Guk Han and Ho Won Kim and Jongin Lim},
      title = {Side Channel Attacks and Countermeasures on Pairing Based Cryptosystems over Binary Fields},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2006/243},
      year = {2006},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/243}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/243}
}
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