Paper 2006/234
RFID Security: Tradeoffs between Security and Efficiency
Ivan Damgård and Michael Østergaard
Abstract
Recently, Juels and Weis defined strong privacy for RFID tags. We add to this definition a completeness and a soundness requirement, i.e., a reader should accept valid tags and only such tags. For the case where tags hold independent keys, we prove a conjecture by Juels and Weis, namely in a strongly private and sound RFID system using only symmetric cryptography, a reader must access virtually all keys in the system when reading a tag. It was already known from work by Molnar et al. that when keys are dependent, the reader only needs to access a logarithmic number of keys, but at a cost in terms of privacy: for that system, strong privacy is lost if an adversary corrupts only a single tag. We propose protocols offering a new range of tradeoffs between security and efficiency. For instance the number of keys accessed by a reader to read a tag can be significantly smaller than the number of tags while retaining security, as long as we assume suitable limitations on the adversary.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- cryptographic protocolsRFID securitysymmetric cryptographyprotocols
- Contact author(s)
- ivan @ daimi au dk
- History
- 2006-07-31: last of 2 revisions
- 2006-07-13: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/234
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/234,
author = {Ivan Damgård and Michael Østergaard},
title = {{RFID} Security: Tradeoffs between Security and Efficiency},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/234},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/234}
}
