Paper 2006/221
Deterministic Authenticated-Encryption: A Provable-Security Treatment of the Key-Wrap Problem
Phillip Rogaway and Thomas Shrimpton
Abstract
Standards bodies have been addressing the key-wrap problem, a cryptographic goal that has never received a provable-security treatment. In response, we provide one, giving definitions, constructions, and proofs. We suggest that key-wrap’s goal is security in the sense of deterministic authenticated-encryption (DAE), a notion that we put forward. We also provide an alternative notion, a pseudorandom injection (PRI), which we prove to be equivalent. We provide a DAE construction, SIV, analyze its concrete security, develop a blockcipher-based instantiation of it, and suggest that the method makes a desirable alternative to the schemes of the X9.102 draft standard. The construction incorporates a method to turn a PRF that operates on a string into an equally efficient PRF that operates on a vector of strings, a problem of independent interest. Finally, we consider IV-based authenticated- encryption (AE) schemes that are maximally forgiving of repeated IVs, a goal we formalize as misuse-resistant AE.We show that a DAE scheme with a vector-valued header, such as SIV, directly realizes this goal.
Note: retitled 9/06
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. An abridged version appeared at Eurocrypt 2006. This is the full version.
- Keywords
- Authenticated encryptioncryptographic definitionscryptographic standardskey wrapping
- Contact author(s)
- teshrim @ cs pdx edu
- History
- 2007-08-20: last of 7 revisions
- 2006-06-30: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/221
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/221,
author = {Phillip Rogaway and Thomas Shrimpton},
title = {Deterministic Authenticated-Encryption: A Provable-Security Treatment of the Key-Wrap Problem},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/221},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/221}
}
