Paper 2006/218
Computationally Sound Symbolic Secrecy in the Presence of Hash Functions
Veronique Cortier, Steve Kremer, Ralf Kuesters, and Bogdan Warinschi
Abstract
The standard symbolic, deducibility-based notions of secrecy are in general insufficient from a cryptographic point of view, especially in presence of hash functions. In this paper we devise and motivate a more appropriate secrecy criterion which exactly captures a standard cryptographic notion of secrecy for protocols involving public-key enryption and hash functions: protocols that satisfy it are computationally secure while any violation of our criterion directly leads to an attack. Furthermore, we prove that our criterion is decidable via an NP decision procedure. Our results hold for standard security notions for encryption and hash functions modeled as random oracles.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. submitted to fsttcs
- Keywords
- automatic verificationcomputational soundness
- Contact author(s)
- bogdan @ cs stanford edu
- History
- 2007-06-29: revised
- 2006-06-30: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/218
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/218,
author = {Veronique Cortier and Steve Kremer and Ralf Kuesters and Bogdan Warinschi},
title = {Computationally Sound Symbolic Secrecy in the Presence of Hash Functions},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/218},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/218}
}
