Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/199

Identity-based Key Agreement Protocols From Pairings

L. Chen and Z. Cheng and N.P. Smart

Abstract: In recent years, a large number of identity-based key agreement protocols from pairings have been proposed. Some of them are elegant and practical. However, the security of this type of protocols has been surprisingly hard to prove. The main issue is that a simulator is not able to deal with reveal queries, because it requires solving either a computational problem or a decisional problem, both of which are generally believed to be hard (i.e., computationally infeasible). The best solution of security proof published so far uses the gap assumption, which means assuming that the existence of a decisional oracle does not change the hardness of the corresponding computational problem. The disadvantage of using this solution to prove the security for this type of protocols is that such decisional oracles, on which the security proof relies, cannot be performed by any polynomial time algorithm in the real world, because of the hardness of the decisional problem. In this paper we present a method incorporating a built-in decisional function in this type of protocols. The function transfers a hard decisional problem in the proof to an easy decisional problem. We then discuss the resulting efficiency of the schemes and the relevant security reductions in the context of different pairings one can use. We pay particular attention, unlike most other papers in the area, to the issues which arise when using asymmetric pairings.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / ID Based Key Agreement Protocols

Date: received 20 Jun 2006, last revised 23 Aug 2006

Contact author: nigel at cs bris ac uk

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Minor clarifications added

Version: 20060823:092626 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2006/199

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