Paper 2006/190
Cryptanalysis of the Dual Elliptic Curve Pseudorandom Generator
Berry Schoenmakers and Andrey Sidorenko
Abstract
The Dual Elliptic Curve Pseudorandom Generator (DEC PRG) is proposed by Barker and Kelsey in a draft NIST Special Publication. It is claimed that the pseudorandom generator is secure unless the adversary can solve the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) for the corresponding elliptic curve. The claim is supported only by an informal discussion. No security reduction is given, that is, it is not shown that an adversary that breaks the pseudorandom generator implies a solver for the ECDLP. Our experimental results and also empirical argument show that the DEC PRG is insecure. The attack does not imply solving the ECDLP for the corresponding elliptic curve. The attack is very efficient.
Note: Several small corrections have been made.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Pseudorandomnessindistinguishability
- Contact author(s)
- a sidorenko @ tue nl
- History
- 2006-09-15: revised
- 2006-06-19: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/190
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/190,
author = {Berry Schoenmakers and Andrey Sidorenko},
title = {Cryptanalysis of the Dual Elliptic Curve Pseudorandom Generator},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/190},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/190}
}
