Paper 2006/189

Unconditionally secure chaffing and winnowing with short authentication tags

D. R. Stinson

Abstract

Rivest proposed the idea of a chaffing-and-winnowing scheme, in which confidentiality is achieved through the use of an authentication code. Thus it would still be possible to have confidential communications even if conventional encryption schemes were outlawed. Hanaoka et al. constructed unconditionally secure chaffing-and-winnowing schemes which achieve perfect secrecy in the sense of Shannon. Their schemes are constructed from unconditionally secure authentication codes. In this paper, we construct unconditionally secure chaffing-and-winnowing schemes from unconditionally secure authentication codes in which the authentication tags are very short. This could be a desirable feature, because certain types of unconditionally secure authentication codes can provide perfect secrecy if the length of an authentication tag is at least as long as the length of the plaintext. The use of such a code might be prohibited if encryption schemes are made illegal, so it is of interest to construct chaffing-and-winnowing schemes based on "short'' authentication tags.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. unpublished, currently submitted for publication
Keywords
authentication codeschaffing-and-winnowing
Contact author(s)
dstinson @ uwaterloo ca
History
2007-03-23: revised
2006-06-19: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/189
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/189,
      author = {D.  R.  Stinson},
      title = {Unconditionally secure chaffing and winnowing with short authentication tags},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/189},
      year = {2006},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/189}
}
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