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Paper 2006/169

Simplified pairing computation and security implications

Steven D. Galbraith and Colm O hEigeartaigh and Caroline Sheedy

Abstract

Recent progress on pairing implementation has made certain pairings extremely simple and fast to compute. Hence, it is natural to examine if there are consequences for the security of pairing-based cryptography. This paper gives a method to compute eta pairings in a way which avoids the requirement for a final exponentiation. The method does not lead to any improvement in the speed of pairing implementation. However, it seems appropriate to re-evaluate the security of pairing based cryptography in light of these new ideas. A multivariate attack on the pairing inversion problem is proposed and analysed. Our findings support the belief that pairing inversion is a hard computational problem.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
pairings
Contact author(s)
coheig @ gmail com
History
2006-05-16: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/169
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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