Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/143
Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation
Guillaume Fumaroli and David Vigilant
Abstract: As the core operation of many public key cryptosystems, group exponentiation is central to cryptography. Attacks on its implementation in embedded device setting is hence of great concern. Recently, implementations resisting both simple side-channel analysis and fault attacks were proposed.
In this paper, we go further and present an algorithm that also inherently thwarts differential side-channel attacks in any finite abelian group with only limited time and storage overhead.
Category / Keywords: implementation / public-key cryptography, side-channel analysis, fault attacks.
Publication Info: To appear in Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography - FDTC 2006, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer.
Date: received 12 Apr 2006, last revised 4 Oct 2006
Contact author: guillaume fumaroli at tremplin-utc net
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20061004:204126 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2006/143
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