Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation

Guillaume Fumaroli; David Vigilant

Paper 2006/143

Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation

Guillaume Fumaroli and David Vigilant

Abstract

As the core operation of many public key cryptosystems, group exponentiation is central to cryptography. Attacks on its implementation in embedded device setting is hence of great concern. Recently, implementations resisting both simple side-channel analysis and fault attacks were proposed. In this paper, we go further and present an algorithm that also inherently thwarts differential side-channel attacks in any finite abelian group with only limited time and storage overhead.

Note: .

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Implementation
Publication info: Published elsewhere. To appear in Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography - FDTC 2006, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer.
Keywords: public-key cryptography side-channel analysis fault attacks.
Contact author(s): guillaume fumaroli @ tremplin-utc net
History: 2006-10-04: last of 5 revisions; 2006-04-12: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2006/143
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/143,
      author = {Guillaume Fumaroli and David Vigilant},
      title = {Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/143},
      year = {2006},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/143}
}