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Paper 2006/131

Provably Secure Ubiquitous Systems: Universally Composable RFID Authentication Protocols

Mike Burmester and Tri van Le and Breno de Medeiros

Abstract

This paper examines two unlinkably anonymous, simple RFID identification protocols that require only the ability to evaluate hash functions and generate random values, and that are provably secure against Byzantine adversaries. The main contribution is a universally composable security model tuned for RFID applications. By making specific setup, communication, and concurrency assumptions that are realistic in the RFID application setting, we arrive at a model that guarantees strong security and availability properties, while still permitting the design of practical RFID protocols. We show that the two previously proposed protocols are provably secure within the new security model. Our proofs do not employ random oracles---the protocols are shown to be secure in the standard model under the assumption of existence of pseudo-random function families.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
RFID securityuniversally composable protocols
Contact author(s)
breno @ cs fsu edu
History
2006-04-29: revised
2006-04-03: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/131
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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