The main contribution is a universally composable security model tuned for RFID applications. By making specific setup, communication, and concurrency assumptions that are realistic in the RFID application setting, we arrive at a model that guarantees strong security and availability properties, while still permitting the design of practical RFID protocols. We show that the two previously proposed protocols are provably secure within the new security model. Our proofs do not employ random oracles---the protocols are shown to be secure in the standard model under the assumption of existence of pseudo-random function families.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / RFID security, universally composable protocols Date: received 1 Apr 2006, last revised 29 Apr 2006 Contact author: breno at cs fsu edu Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20060429:201124 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2006/131 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion