Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/130

Simulatable Security and Polynomially Bounded Concurrent Composition

Dennis Hofheinz and Dominique Unruh

Abstract: Simulatable security is a security notion for multi-party protocols that implies strong composability features. The main definitional flavours of simulatable security are standard simulatability, universal simulatability, and black-box simulatability. All three come in "computational," "statistical" and "perfect" subflavours indicating the considered adversarial power. Universal and black-box simulatability, in all of their subflavours, are already known to guarantee that the concurrent composition even of a polynomial number of secure protocols stays secure.

We show that computational standard simulatability does not allow for secure concurrent composition of polynomially many protocols, but we also show that statistical standard simulatability does. The first result assumes the existence of an interesting cryptographic tool (namely time-lock puzzles), and its proof employs a cryptographic multi-party computation in an interesting and unconventional way.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Reactive Simulatability, Universal Composability, concurrent composition

Publication Info: Short version accepted at IEEE SSP 2006. This is the full version.

Date: received 31 Mar 2006

Contact author: Dennis Hofheinz at cwi nl

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20060403:153352 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2006/130

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion