Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/088
On the Feasibility of Consistent Computations
Sven Laur and Helger Lipmaa
Abstract: In many practical settings, participants are willing to deviate from
the protocol only if they remain undetected. Aumann and Lindell
introduced a concept of covert adversaries to formalize this type of
corruption. In the current paper, we refine their model to get
stronger security guarantees. Namely, we show how to construct
protocols, where malicious participants cannot learn anything beyond
their intended outputs and honest participants can detect malicious
behavior that alters their outputs. As this construction does not
protect honest parties from selective protocol failures, a valid
corruption complaint can leak a single bit of information about the
inputs of honest parties. Importantly, it is often up to the honest
party to decide whether to complain or not. This potential leakage
is often compensated by gains in efficiency---many standard
zero-knowledge proof steps can be omitted. As a concrete practical
contribution, we show how to implement consistent versions of
several important cryptographic protocols such as oblivious
transfer, conditional disclosure of secrets and private inference
control.
Category / Keywords: Consistency, equivocal and extractable commitment, oblivious transfer, private inference control
Publication Info: PKC 2010 (this is the full version)
Date: received 7 Mar 2006, last revised 12 Mar 2010
Contact author: lipmaa at research cyber ee
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: 2006-11-07: This is a thoroughly rewritten version of the previous eprint with the same number called 'On Security of Sublinear Oblivious Transfer'. While the basic protocol itself has not changed, almost everything else is new.
2008-09-30: A paper that was in comatosis for two years. The current version is thoroughly rewritten.
2010-03-12: The full version of the PKC 2010 paper.
Version: 20100312:213253 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2006/088
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