Paper 2006/087
Analysis of the SPV Secure Routing Protocol: Weaknesses and Lessons
Barath Raghavan, Saurabh Panjwani, and Anton Mityagin
Abstract
We analyze a secure routing protocol, Secure Path Vector (SPV), proposed in SIGCOMM 2004. SPV aims to provide authenticity for route announcements in the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) using an efficient alternative to ordinary digital signatures, called constant-time signatures. Today, SPV is often considered the best cryptographic defense for BGP. We find subtle flaws in the design of SPV which lead to attacks that can be mounted by 60% of Autonomous Systems in the Internet. In addition, we study several of SPV's design decisions and assumptions and highlight the requirements for security of routing protocols. In light of our analysis, we reexamine the need for constant-time signatures and find that certain standard digital signature schemes can provide the same level of efficiency for route authenticity.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communications Review, April 2007
- Keywords
- routingsignaturesBGP
- Contact author(s)
- barath @ cs ucsd edu
- History
- 2007-04-26: last of 4 revisions
- 2006-03-07: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/087
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/087,
author = {Barath Raghavan and Saurabh Panjwani and Anton Mityagin},
title = {Analysis of the {SPV} Secure Routing Protocol: Weaknesses and Lessons},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/087},
year = {2006},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/087}
}
