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Paper 2006/072

Cryptanalysis of the Bluetooth E0 Cipher using OBDD's

Yaniv Shaked and Avishai Wool

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the E0 cipher, which is the cipher used in the Bluetooth specifications. We adapted and optimized the Binary Decision Diagram attack of Krause, for the specific details of E0. Our method requires 128 known bits of the keystream in order to recover the initial value of the four LFSR's in the E0 system. We describe several variants which we built to lower the complexity of the attack. We evaluated our attack against the real (non-reduced) E0 cipher. Our best attack can recover the initial value of the four LFSR's, for the first time, with a realistic space complexity of 2^23 (84MB RAM), and with a time complexity of 2^87. This attack can be massively parallelized to lower the overall time complexity. Beyond the specifics of E0, our work describes practical experience with BDD-based cryptanalysis, which so far has mostly been a theoretical concept.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Stream cipherCryptanalysisBluetoothBDD
Contact author(s)
yash @ eng tau ac il
History
2006-03-27: revised
2006-02-24: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/072
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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