Paper 2006/069
Automated Security Proofs with Sequences of Games
Bruno Blanchet and David Pointcheval
Abstract
This paper presents the first automatic technique for proving not only protocols but also primitives in the exact security computational model. Automatic proofs of cryptographic protocols were up to now reserved to the Dolev-Yao model, which however makes quite strong assumptions on the primitives. On the other hand, with the proofs by reductions, in the complexity theoretic framework, more subtle security assumptions can be considered, but security analyses are manual. A process calculus is thus defined in order to take into account the probabilistic semantics of the computational model. It is already rich enough to describe all the usual security notions of both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, as well as the basic computational assumptions. As an example, we illustrate the use of the new tool with the proof of a quite famous asymmetric primitive: unforgeability under chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA) of the Full-Domain Hash signature scheme under the (trapdoor)-one-wayness of some permutations.
Note: Fixes an error in Definition 1.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- A major revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2006
- DOI
- 10.1007/11818175_32
- Keywords
- security proofautomatic proofssequences of gamescomputationally sound
- Contact author(s)
- bruno blanchet @ inria fr
- History
- 2020-12-03: last of 3 revisions
- 2006-02-23: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2006/069
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/069,
author = {Bruno Blanchet and David Pointcheval},
title = {Automated Security Proofs with Sequences of Games},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2006/069},
year = {2006},
doi = {10.1007/11818175_32},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/069}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/069}
}
