Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2006/056
Key Exchange Protocols: Security Definition, Proof Method and Applications
Anupam Datta and Ante Derek and John C. Mitchell and Bogdan Warinschi
Abstract: We develop a compositional method for proving cryptographically
sound security properties of key exchange protocols, based on a symbolic logic that is interpreted over conventional runs of a protocol against a probabilistic polynomial-time attacker.
Since key indistinguishability and other previous specifications
of secure key exchange suffer from specific compositionality problems, we develop a suitable specification of acceptable key generation. This definition is based on a simple game played by an adversary against a key exchange protocol and a conventional challenger characterizing secure encryption (or other primitives of interest). The method is illustrated using a sample protocol.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols /
Date: received 14 Feb 2006
Contact author: aderek at cs stanford edu
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Version: 20060215:212548 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2006/056
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