Paper 2006/037

Message Authentication on 64-bit Architectures

Ted Krovetz

Abstract

This paper takes UMAC --- a message authentication algorithm (MAC) optimized for performance on 32-bit architectures --- as its starting point, and adapts its strategies for optimum performance on 64-bit architectures. The resulting MAC, called UMAC8, achieves per message forgery probabilities of about 260 and 2120 for tags of length 64 and 128 bits. The UMAC strategies are discussed at length and adapted for 64-bit environments, but are also modified to address several UMAC shortcomings, particularly key-agility and susceptibility to timing attacks. UMAC achieved peak throughput rates, when generating 64-bit tags, of 1.0 CPU cycle per byte of message authenticated, while UMAC8 achieves 0.5 cycles per byte.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
message authentication codes
Contact author(s)
tdk @ acm org
History
2006-02-06: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2006/037
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2006/037,
      author = {Ted Krovetz},
      title = {Message Authentication on 64-bit Architectures},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2006/037},
      year = {2006},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2006/037}
}
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