Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2005/451

Weaknesses of the Boyd-Mao Deniable Authenticated key Establishment for Internet Protocols

Jue-Sam Chou and Yalin Chen and Ming-De Yang

Abstract: In 2003, Boyd and Mao proposed two deniable authenticated key establishment protocols using elliptic curve pairings for Internet protocols, one is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the other is based on Public-Key Encryption approach. For the use of elliptic curve pairings, they declared that their schemes could be more efficient than the existing Internet Key Exchange (IKE), nowadays. However in this paper, we will show that both of Boyd-Mao¡¦s protocols suffer from the key-Compromise Impersonation attack.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / deniable authenticated key establishment, Internet Key Exchange (IKE),key-Compromise Impersonation attack, elliptic curve cryptosystem

Publication Info: not be duplicates of work published previously or scheduled to be published

Date: received 9 Dec 2005

Contact author: jschou at mail nhu edu tw

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20051214:164233 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2005/451

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