Paper 2005/451
Weaknesses of the Boyd-Mao Deniable Authenticated key Establishment for Internet Protocols
Jue-Sam Chou, Yalin Chen, and Ming-De Yang
Abstract
In 2003, Boyd and Mao proposed two deniable authenticated key establishment protocols using elliptic curve pairings for Internet protocols, one is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange and the other is based on Public-Key Encryption approach. For the use of elliptic curve pairings, they declared that their schemes could be more efficient than the existing Internet Key Exchange (IKE), nowadays. However in this paper, we will show that both of Boyd-Mao¡¦s protocols suffer from the key-Compromise Impersonation attack.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. not be duplicates of work published previously or scheduled to be published
- Keywords
- deniable authenticated key establishmentInternet Key Exchange (IKE)key-Compromise Impersonation attackelliptic curve cryptosystem
- Contact author(s)
- jschou @ mail nhu edu tw
- History
- 2005-12-14: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2005/451
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/451,
author = {Jue-Sam Chou and Yalin Chen and Ming-De Yang},
title = {Weaknesses of the Boyd-Mao Deniable Authenticated key Establishment for Internet Protocols},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/451},
year = {2005},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/451}
}
