Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2005/444
Privacy-Preserving Polling using Playing Cards
Sid Stamm and Markus Jakobsson
Abstract:
Visualizing protocols is not only useful as a step towards
understanding and ensuring security properties, but is also a
beneficial tool to communicate notions of security to decision
makers and technical people outside the field of cryptography. We
present a simple card game that is a visualization for a secure
protocol for private polling where it is simple to see that
individual responses cannot be traced back to a respondent, and
cheating is irrational. We use visualization tricks to illustrate a
somewhat complex protocol, namely the Cryptographic Randomized
Response Technique protocol of Lipmaa et al. While our tools ---
commitments and cut-and-choose --- are well known, our construction
for oblivious transfer using playing cards is new. As part of
visualizing the protocol, we have been able to show that, while
cut-and-choose protocols normally get more secure with an increasing
number of choices, the protocol we consider --- surprisingly ---
does not. This is true for our visualization of the protocol and
for the real protocol.
Category / Keywords: card game, polls, privacy, randomized response technique, rational equilibrium, voting
Date: received 5 Dec 2005
Contact author: sstamm at indiana edu
Available formats: PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20051207:072909 (All versions of this report)
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