Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2005/440
HB++: a Lightweight Authentication Protocol Secure against Some Attacks
Julien Bringer and Hervé Chabanne and Emmanuelle Dottax
Abstract: At Crypto'05, Juels and Weis introduce HB+, an enhancement of the Hopper and Blum (HB) authentication protocol. This protocol HB+ is proven secure against active attacks, though preserving HB's advantages: mainly, requiring so few resources to run that it can be implemented on an RFID tag. However, in a wider adversarial model, Gilbert, Robshaw and Sibert exhibit a very effective attack against HB+.
We here show how a modification of the HB+ protocol thwarts Gilbert et al's attack. The resulting protocol, HB++, remains a good candidate for RFID tags authentication.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / HB+ protocol, active attacks, RFID
Date: received 30 Nov 2005, last revised 12 Jan 2006, withdrawn 8 Feb 2006
Contact author: julien bringer at sagem com
Available format(s): (-- withdrawn --)
Version: 20060208:094848 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2005/440
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