You are looking at a specific version 20051006:225738 of this paper. See the latest version.

Paper 2005/351

Errors in Computational Complexity Proofs for Protocols

Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo and Colin Boyd and Yvonne Hitchcock

Abstract

Proofs are invaluable tools in assuring protocol implementers about the security properties of protocols. However, several instances of undetected flaws in the proofs of protocols (resulting in flawed protocols) undermine the credibility of provably-secure protocols. In this work, we examine several protocols with claimed proofs of security by Boyd & Gonzalez Nieto (2003), Jakobsson & Pointcheval (2001), and Wong & Chan (2001), and an authenticator by Bellare, Canetti, & Krawczyk (1998). Using these protocols as case studies, we reveal previously unpublished flaws in these protocols and their proofs. We hope our analysis will enable similar mistakes to be avoided in the future.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Publication info
Published elsewhere. The abridged version of this paper is going to appear in the proceedings of Asiacrypt 2005, LNCS 3788/2005 (pp. 624--643).
Keywords
Cryptographic protocolsProvable Security
Contact author(s)
k choo @ qut edu au
History
2005-10-06: revised
2005-10-05: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2005/351
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.