Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2005/351
Errors in Computational Complexity Proofs for Protocols
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo and Colin Boyd and Yvonne Hitchcock
Abstract: Proofs are invaluable tools in assuring protocol implementers about the security properties of protocols. However, several instances of undetected flaws in the proofs of protocols (resulting in flawed protocols) undermine the credibility of provably-secure protocols. In this work, we examine several protocols with claimed proofs of security by Boyd & Gonzalez Nieto (2003), Jakobsson & Pointcheval (2001), and Wong & Chan (2001), and an authenticator by Bellare, Canetti, & Krawczyk (1998). Using these protocols as case studies, we reveal previously unpublished flaws in these protocols and their proofs. We hope our analysis will enable similar mistakes to be avoided in the future.
Category / Keywords: Cryptographic protocols, Provable Security
Publication Info: The abridged version of this paper is going to appear in the proceedings of Asiacrypt 2005, LNCS 3788/2005 (pp. 624--643).
Date: received 3 Oct 2005, last revised 6 Oct 2005
Contact author: k choo at qut edu au
Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20051006:225738 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2005/351
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