Errors in Computational Complexity Proofs for Protocols

Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo; Colin Boyd; Yvonne Hitchcock

Paper 2005/351

Errors in Computational Complexity Proofs for Protocols

Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, Colin Boyd, and Yvonne Hitchcock

Abstract

Proofs are invaluable tools in assuring protocol implementers about the security properties of protocols. However, several instances of undetected flaws in the proofs of protocols (resulting in flawed protocols) undermine the credibility of provably-secure protocols. In this work, we examine several protocols with claimed proofs of security by Boyd & Gonzalez Nieto (2003), Jakobsson & Pointcheval (2001), and Wong & Chan (2001), and an authenticator by Bellare, Canetti, & Krawczyk (1998). Using these protocols as case studies, we reveal previously unpublished flaws in these protocols and their proofs. We hope our analysis will enable similar mistakes to be avoided in the future.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF PS
Publication info: Published elsewhere. The abridged version of this paper is going to appear in the proceedings of Asiacrypt 2005, LNCS 3788/2005 (pp. 624--643).
Keywords: Cryptographic protocols Provable Security
Contact author(s): k choo @ qut edu au
History: 2005-10-06: revised; 2005-10-05: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2005/351
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/351,
      author = {Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo and Colin Boyd and Yvonne Hitchcock},
      title = {Errors in Computational Complexity Proofs for Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/351},
      year = {2005},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/351}
}