Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2005/321

Exact Maximum Expected Differential and Linear Probability for 2-Round Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

Liam Keliher and Jiayuan Sui

Abstract: Provable security of a block cipher against differential~/ linear cryptanalysis is based on the \emph{maximum expected differential~/ linear probability} (MEDP~/ MELP) over $T \geq 2$ core rounds. Over the past few years, several results have provided increasingly tight upper and lower bounds in the case $T=2$ for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). We show that the \emph{exact} value of the 2-round MEDP~/ MELP for the AES is equal to the best known lower bound: $53/2^{34} \approx 1.656 \times 2^{-29}$~/ $109,953,193/2^{54} \approx 1.638 \times 2^{-28}$. This immediately yields an improved upper bound on the AES MEDP~/ MELP for $T \geq 4$, namely $\left( 53/2^{34} \right)^4 \approx 1.881 \times 2^{-114}$~/ $\left( 109,953,193/2^{54} \right)^4 \approx 1.802 \times 2^{-110}$.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / AES, Rijndael, block ciphers, SPN, provable security, differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis

Date: received 10 Sep 2005, last revised 15 Sep 2005

Contact author: lkeliher at mta ca

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Revision to fix problem with PS file. Content unchanged.

Version: 20050915:185909 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2005/321

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