

# An Authentication Protocol For Mobile Agents Using Bilinear Pairings

Amitabh Saxena, and Ben Soh  
Dept. of Computer Science and Computer Engineering  
La Trobe University, Bundoora, VIC, Australia 3086

September 1, 2005

## Abstract

A mobile agent is a mobile program capable of maintaining its execution states as it migrates between different execution platforms. A key security problem in the mobile agent paradigm is that of trust: How to ensure that the past itinerary (of execution platforms) claimed by the agent is correct. This is necessary in order to establish a reasonable level of trust for the agent before granting execution privileges.

In this paper we describe a protocol using bilinear pairings that enables trust relationships to be formed between agent platforms in an ad-hoc manner without actively involving any trusted third party. This protocol can be used to authenticate agents before granting execution privileges. The main idea behind our approach is the concept of ‘one-way’ chaining. Our scheme has chosen ciphertext security assuming the hardness of the Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem (BDHP).

## 1 Introduction

Mobile agents are agents that can physically travel across networks and perform tasks on machines that provide agent hosting capability. This allows processes to migrate from computer to computer, for processes to split into multiple instances that execute on different machines, and to return to their point of origin. A detailed discussion of mobile agents is beyond the scope of this paper and the reader is referred to [1]. Two foremost security challenges for mobile agents are (a) host protection and (b) agent protection. Our work on mobile agents is focused only on host protection. For work on agent protection the reader is referred to [2, 3, 4, 5].

In contrast to approaches for host protection based on sandbox environments or other forms of code validation, our model aims to validate the itinerary of an agent. Our approach to security is based on a notion of trust which is summarized as follows: If all entities involved with the agent can be authenticated, a level of trust can be established, which can then be used for granting or denying execution privileges. Current solutions for host protection rely on tamper proof hardware, an on line trusted third party or a ‘sandbox’ model of execution [6, 7, 8]. Our method does not require any such measures. We use the concept of *one-way* signatures to connect arbitrary hosts in a chain of trust, thus enabling ad-hoc trust relationships to be formed.

The concept of one-way signature chaining was proposed in [9] and [10] where the authors constructed authentication protocols for mobile agents using hypothetical cryptographic primitives known as *strong non-commutative associative one-way functions*. The authors also asked if an equivalent protocol can be constructed using any existing cryptographic primitives. In this paper, we answer this question affirmatively and show that the mobile agent authentication protocol presented in [10] can be constructed using bilinear pairings, thus settling their open question.

Although the original concept of signature chaining presented in [10] is based on a standard certificate based Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), it can be shown that their model can be reduced directly to an Identity-Based Public Key Cryptosystem (ID-PKC) or a Certificate-Less Public Key Cryptosystem (CL-PKC) due to certain properties of the one-way function used.<sup>1</sup> In contrast to this, the protocol presented in this paper is based on a standard certificate based PKI and it is not known if a direct reduction to an ID-PKC or a CL-PKC exists.

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<sup>1</sup>The reader is referred to [11] for a discussion of an ID-PKC and to [12] for a discussion of a CL-PKC

## 2 Background

Any entity that runs a mobile agent platform server is called a *host*. We assume that all such hosts are identified by a public directory. Any host that initiated an agent into the system is called the *initiator* of the agent. Agents can migrate autonomously between different host platforms. This act of migration is called *agent transfer*. An *instance* of an agent is a snapshot of its state at any point of execution on some platform. An *itinerary* is the ordered list of hosts visited by an agent.

### 2.1 Agent partitioning

Using the object oriented paradigm, we assume that any instance of a mobile agent can be split (or partitioned) into a *static* part (consisting of object methods) which is unchanging as the agent hops across platforms and a *dynamic* part (consisting of data and the state information of the interacting objects) that changes at each hop. Depending on the specific implementation, the partitioning schemes can differ. However, in this section we enumerate certain properties relevant in our context.

1. *Unique*: It may be possible that an instance of the agent can be partitioned in more than one ways. A partition scheme is *unique* if all instances of the agent have a unique static and dynamic part.
2. *Identical*: A partition scheme is *identical* if all instances of the agent have at least one common static part.
3. *Mutually authenticating*: We further assume that some static and dynamic parts can be made mutually inseparable. This means that the agent's functionality is available if and only if both the static and dynamic parts correspond to the same agent. Mixing and matching between different agents is not possible. We say that the scheme is *mutually authenticating* if all instances of the agent have at least one mutually inseparable partition.
4. *Ideal*: A partitioning scheme is *ideal* if it is unique, identical and mutually authenticating.

### 2.2 Authentication Requirements

In this section, we give the high-level authentication requirements for our model. we define the following two requirements:

1. *Initiator authentication*: Is the claimed initiator the same as the real initiator?
2. *Itinerary authentication*: Is the claimed itinerary the same as the real itinerary?

Our requirement for unconditional security is itinerary authentication. It is evident, however, that this will also always involve initiator authentication, since the initiator is the first host in the itinerary. We introduce the concept of *relative authentication* to imply that the first host (the initiator) in an itinerary is unknown. On the other hand, *absolute authentication* implies that the initiator can be authenticated.

### 2.3 One-way Chaining

Represent the host platforms as points of an acyclic directed graph. As the agent hops, a new arc directed from the receiver to the sender is added to the graph. The edges of such a graph will represent a hop-by-hop path of the agent in the reverse direction from the current host to the initiator. In this notation the statements “*a* passed the agent to *b*” and “There is a path of unit length from *b* to *a*” are considered equivalent. We can consider this graph to describe the path by which trust is propagated in the system.<sup>2</sup>

1. We say that a *direct* path exists from *b* to *a* if and only if *b* can prove (in the context of the agent) something about *a* that no other host can. That is, *b* has some *extra* information about *a* that others cannot extract from *b*'s proof.
2. Let  $\{h_0, h_1, \dots, h_n\}$  be a set of hosts for some  $n \geq 1$ . We say a *chained* path exists from  $h_n$  to  $h_0$  if and only if there exists a direct path from  $h_x$  to  $h_{x-1}$  for each  $x$  from 1 to  $n$ .

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<sup>2</sup>We intuitively define trust to propagate in the reverse direction of the agent. If the agent moves from *a* to *b*, we are interested to know if *b* trusts *a*. That is, if there is path from *b* to *a*. Moreover we are only interested in those hosts that modified the dynamic part.

3. We say that there is a *one-way* chained path from  $b$  to  $a$  if and only if there is a chained path from  $b$  to  $a$  and there is no (direct or chained) path from  $a$  to any other host.

Assume that  $i$  is the initiator of the agent,  $a$  is any sending host and  $b$  is the receiving host. Also, excepting the act of agent transfer no other interaction is allowed between any hosts. Using this scenario, authentication can be redefined in the context of  $b$  as follows:

- (a) *Relative*: Determine that a chained path from  $a$  to  $i$  exists.
- (b) *Absolute*: Determine that a one-way chained path from  $a$  to  $i$  exists.

## 2.4 Definitions

- (a) Fix the alphabet  $\Sigma = \{0, 1\}$ . The set of strings over  $\Sigma$  is denoted by  $\Sigma^*$  and the set of all strings over  $\Sigma$  of length  $\leq l$  are denoted by  $\Sigma^l$ . For any  $x, y \in \Sigma^*$  the symbol  $x||y$  denotes the concatenation of  $x$  and  $y$ . The empty string is denoted by the symbol  $\epsilon$ .
- (b) If  $a, b$  are two variables of the same type, then  $a \leftarrow b$  denotes that  $a$  is set to the value of  $b$ . If  $\mathbb{A}$  is a non-empty set, then  $x \leftarrow \mathbb{A}$  denotes that  $x$  has been uniformly chosen in  $\mathbb{A}$ . The symbol  $|\mathbb{A}|$  denotes the cardinality of  $\mathbb{A}$ . Throughout this paper we will use the symbol  $\mathbb{Z}$  to denote the set of integers and the symbol  $\mathbb{I}$  to denote the set of all identities  $\{I_1, I_2, \dots\}$ .
- (c) We denote any (ordered) sequence of  $n$  elements  $\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n$  symbolically by  $\langle \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n \rangle$ . The *empty* sequence is a sequence without any elements and is denoted by  $\langle \rangle$ . If  $S = \langle \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n \rangle$  is some finite sequence then  $\langle S, \alpha_i \rangle = \langle \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \dots, \alpha_n, \alpha_i \rangle$  is also a finite sequence. For any finite set  $\mathbb{A}$ , the symbol  $\langle \mathbb{A} \rangle$  denotes the set of all sequences having (non-repeating) elements from  $\mathbb{A}$ .
- (d) *Fixed Strings*: Let  $\mathbb{L}_1$  and  $\mathbb{L}_2$  be any two languages. For some  $x \in \mathbb{L}_1$  and some  $y \in \mathbb{L}_2$ , the pair  $\langle x, y \rangle$  is said to be *fixed* if and only if there exists a (polynomial-time computable) binary function  $\sigma : \mathbb{L}_1 \times \mathbb{L}_2 \mapsto \{0, 1\}$  such that  $\sigma(x, y) = 1$  and it is computationally intractable to find another string  $\hat{y} \in \mathbb{L}_2$  such that  $\sigma(x, \hat{y}) = 1$ .

## 2.5 Bilinear Pairings

The fundamental building blocks of our protocol are a class of primitives known as *bilinear pairings*<sup>3</sup> defined as follows: Let  $\mathbb{G}_1$  be a cyclic additive group of prime order  $q$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order. Assume that computing the discrete logarithm in both  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$  is hard. A bilinear pairing is a map  $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \mapsto \mathbb{G}_2$  that satisfies the following properties:

1. *Bilinearity*:  $e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)^{ab} \quad \forall P, Q \in \mathbb{G}_1 \text{ and } a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q$
2. *Non-degeneracy*:  $P \neq 0 \Rightarrow e(P, P) \neq 1$
3. *Computability*:  $e$  is efficiently computable

Typically, the map  $e$  will be derived from either the Weil or Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite field. Despite the fairly complex mathematics involved in constructing such maps, cryptographic protocols based on pairings can be described entirely without ever referring to the actual implementation. Pairings and other parameters should be selected in proactive for efficiency and security. We refer the reader to [19, 11, 20] for details on generating secure parameters for such pairings. A more general definition of bilinear pairings (also suitable for our purpose) using three groups is a map  $e : \mathbb{G}_0 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \mapsto \mathbb{G}_2$  such that an efficiently computable isomorphism  $\mathbb{G}_1 \mapsto \mathbb{G}_0$  exists and the usual properties of bilinearity, non-degeneracy and computability are satisfied [19]. For simplicity in this paper we assume  $\mathbb{G}_0 = \mathbb{G}_1$ .

Our motivation to use pairings is due to the fact that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (DDHP) in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  is easy while both the Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP) and the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) are hard in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  (see [19] for a proof). Such groups (where DDHP is easy but DHP is hard) are generally referred to as *Gap* Diffie Hellman (GDH) groups [21].

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<sup>3</sup>Bilinear pairings are probably best known for their use in Identity Based Encryption (IBE) by Boneh and Franklin in 2001 [11]. Many other applications of bilinear pairings are known. For example, various types of Identity Based Signatures (IBS) [13, 14, 15], tripartite one-round key agreement [16], Certificate-Less Public Key Cryptography (CL-PKC) [12], self-blindable credential certificates [17] and authenticated key agreement [18] are all based on pairings.

Our scheme is similar to the batch signature scheme presented in [19] or the aggregate signature schemes in [22] where signatures of many users (on different messages) are verified in one single step. In our scheme, signatures of many users on the same message are verified at once. Moreover in our scheme, the exact order of individual signers involved in creating the aggregate signatures is preserved.

### 3 Problem Formulation

In this section, we will define the problem of host protection using authentication primitives and set out the goals of our proposed authentication protocol. Although we consider only one agent in our analysis, this setup can also be used in a multi-agent system. We model our protocol on the following assumptions:

1. The mobile agent will be partitioned using an ideal partitioning scheme (see section 2.1). Without loss of generality we assume that the identities of the first  $n$  participants is the ordered sequence  $\langle I_1, I_2, \dots, I_n \rangle$  where  $I_i \in \mathbb{I}$  for each positive integer  $i$ . Represent by  $M$ , the static part and by  $D_i$  the dynamic part of the  $i^{th}$  instance. For any agent  $\langle M, D_i \rangle$ , the sending platform is  $I_i$  and the receiving platform is  $I_{i+1}$  and the initiator is  $I_1$ . Agents are allowed to travel indefinitely and also to replicate and branch to different paths. The only restriction is that an agent must not return back to a past platform (except at the end of its itinerary).
2. To enable absolute authentication, we require that the pair  $\langle M, I_1 \rangle$  be fixed (see section 2.4). A possible approach for this is to involve a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to certify this pair. The TTP ensures that the same pair cannot be reused again for a certain period of time. We note, however, that it may also be possible to implicitly fix the pair  $\langle M, I_1 \rangle$  (without involving a TTP) using the methods for code obfuscation, undetachable signatures and watermarking described in [2, 4, 5, 23, 24, 25, 26, 9]. For simplicity, in this paper, we assume a TTP is used to fix the pair  $\langle M, I_1 \rangle$ .<sup>4</sup>
3. The mobile agent *must* always transferred with an accompanying signature. Each receiving platform  $I_i$  *must* verify the signature of the previous platform before it is executed. Execution should only be possible if the verification process succeeds and other security policies of the platform are satisfied.
4. Each sending platform  $I_i$  *must* sign the agent after it completes execution and before it is transferred. Moreover if this sending platform is not the first platform in the chain, it should sign the agent only if the verification process on the signature of the previous platform succeeded.
5. Each receiving platform would like to know the exact order of the platforms involved in passing (and executing) the agent. The purpose of the signature scheme is to ensure that the verification process succeeds if and only if the correct order of participants is given as input to the process. Any misbehavior (deviation from the signing or verification process) should be detected along with the concerned participant(s).
6. The itinerary of the agent is ‘ad-hoc’. It is not possible for any platform  $I_i$  to determine the exact future itinerary of the agent (we can consider the agent to be autonomous in this case). Thus, a sending platform may not know the real identity of the next receiving platform. For simplicity, we assume that each sending platform  $I_i$  *does not* need to know the identity of the next receiving platform  $I_{i+1}$  at the time of signing.
7. Agent transfer is done over a secure channel where confidentiality is assured by the use of encryption. A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) will be used for authentication (in the next section, we will describe this PKI). If needed, the same or a different PKI can be used for encryption.

### 4 Our Authentication Protocol

A one-time initial setup is necessary during which our participants create a public-key directory. Once this setup is complete, Any member can initiate an agent into the system. Members can also execute an agent and transfer agents to other members. Our protocol allows multi-hop agents to be authenticated.

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<sup>4</sup>The concept of *liability* is worth mentioning here. In most cases, trust and liability go hand in hand: If Alice is trusted, she is liable if she fails the trust. An attacker will try to gain more trust but not liability. In the situation mentioned here, if the attacker removes all the names from the list and  $\langle M, I_1 \rangle$  is not fixed, it may be possible that the attacker becomes automatically more liable (since the attacker’s name cannot be removed from the list). We can safely ignore this possibility in applications where the liability of removing the names outweighs the the benefit gained from such an attack.

## 4.1 Initial Setup (Create PKI)

A public directory (or PKI) will be used to authenticate messages (and if necessary to encrypt them). The PKI we describe is based on bilinear pairings<sup>5</sup> and a trusted central authority is responsible for generating the security parameters. To participate in the protocol each user must have a certified public key (the process of certification is outside the scope of our protocol). The setup proceeds as follows:

1. Let  $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \mapsto \mathbb{G}_2$  be a bilinear mapping as defined in section 2.5. Let  $P \in \mathbb{G}_1$  be a generator of  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and let  $H : \Sigma^* \mapsto \mathbb{G}_1$  and  $h : \Sigma^* \mapsto \Sigma^l$  be two cryptographic hash functions. The parameters  $\langle e, q, \mathbb{G}_1, P, H, h \rangle$  are generated by the trusted authority and made public in an authentic way.
2. Each participant  $I_i$  generates  $x_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$  as the private key. The corresponding public key is  $Y_i = x_i P$
3. Each participant who wants to sign messages obtains a certificate from some trusted CA linking the identity  $I_i$  and the public key  $Y_i$

This infrastructure can also be used to encrypt messages to any receiver  $I_j$  with the (certified or uncertified) public key  $x_j P$  using the protocol presented in [29] as follows: The sender will first encrypt the message with a symmetric cipher using the key derived from  $K = r_j(x_j P)$  where  $r_j \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ . The sender will transmit the ciphertext along with the partial key  $L = r_j P$  using an insecure public channel. Receiver  $I_j$  can compute the same key-derivation key  $K = x_j L$  to decrypt the ciphertext. This protocol is secure if the Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP) in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  is hard [30].

## 4.2 Agent Initiation

As mentioned earlier, the initiator  $I_1$  will use a TTP to fix the pair  $\langle M, I_1 \rangle$  to ensure that a different user cannot act as the initiator for the same message in the future.  $I_1$  sends a request to the TTP to certify the pair  $\langle M, I_1 \rangle$ . Denote by  $C$  the certificate from the TTP.

## 4.3 Transfer Protocol

An arbitrary participant  $I_i$  will process the agent as follows: On receiving it from  $I_{i-1}$ , it first follows the verification procedure. Before passing the agent (after execution) to  $I_{i+1}$ , it follows the signing procedure. The first participant  $I_1$ , however, only follows the signing procedure. As mentioned earlier, messages and signatures are sent over a secure encrypted channel. Thus, an eavesdropper does not have access to the signature of  $I_i$  sent to  $I_{i+1}$ . In the definitions below we assume that **MESSAGE** denotes the agent which consists of both static and dynamic parts.

### Notation

1. A correctly formed signature consists of the following components: a certificate **CERTIFICATE**, a list of identifiers **IDENTIFIER-LIST**, a signature on the static part **STATIC-PART**, a signature on the dynamic part **DYNAMIC-PART**.
2. The signing procedure **CREATE-CHAIN-SIGNATURE** takes three inputs: a valid message **MESSAGE**, a valid signature **OLD-SIGNATURE** and an identifier **IDENTIFIER**. It either outputs a new valid signature **NEW-SIGNATURE** or the error **ERROR**.
3. The verification procedure, **VERIFY-CHAIN-SIGNATURE** takes two inputs: a message **MESSAGE** and a signature **SIGNATURE** and outputs **TRUE** or **FALSE**.
4. Let  $j \geq 0, k \geq 1$  be integers. Define the variables  $t_j \in \Sigma^*, L_j \in \langle \mathbb{I} \rangle$  and  $U_j, V_j \in \mathbb{G}_1$  as follows:
  - (a)  $t_0 = \epsilon$  the empty string,  $L_0 = \langle \rangle$ , the empty sequence and  $U_0 = V_0 = 0$
  - (b)  $t_k = h(t_{k-1} \| h(I_k))$
  - (c)  $U_k = x_k H(M) + x_k H(t_k) + U_{k-1} = \sum_{r=1}^{r=k} x_r (H(M) + H(t_r))$
  - (d)  $V_k = x_j H(M \| D_k)$
  - (e)  $L_k = \langle L_{k-1}, I_k \rangle = \langle I_1, I_2, \dots, I_k \rangle$

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<sup>5</sup>Although bilinear pairings are mostly known for their use in identity based cryptography, other non-identity based applications also have been proposed [19, 27, 28].

**(A) CREATE-CHAIN-SIGNATURE**

This procedure takes as input the MESSAGE  $\langle M, D_i \rangle$ , the IDENTIFIER  $I_i$ , the signature OLD-SIGNATURE and outputs NEW-SIGNATURE or ERROR where:

$$\text{OLD-SIGNATURE} = \langle C, L_{i-1}, U_{i-1}, V_{i-1} \rangle \text{ and } \text{NEW-SIGNATURE} = \langle C, L_i, U_i, V_i \rangle$$

We describe this procedure algorithmically:

1. Output ERROR if OLD-SIGNATURE, MESSAGE or IDENTIFIER has an invalid structure otherwise extract the following:
  - (a)  $I_i$  from IDENTIFIER
  - (b)  $\langle M, D_i \rangle$  from MESSAGE
  - (c)  $C$  from CERTIFICATE of OLD-SIGNATURE
  - (d)  $L_{i-1} = \langle I_1, I_2, \dots, I_{i-1} \rangle$  from IDENTIFIER-LIST of OLD-SIGNATURE
  - (e)  $U_{i-1}$  from STATIC-PART of OLD-SIGNATURE
2. Output ERROR if the private key  $x_i$  corresponding to  $I_i$  is not known otherwise compute the following:
  - (a)  $L_i = \langle L_{i-1}, I_i \rangle = \langle I_1, I_2, \dots, I_i \rangle$
  - (b)  $t_i$  from  $L_i$  using the algorithm:  $t_0 \leftarrow \epsilon, t_j \leftarrow h(t_{j-1} \| h(I_j))$
  - (c)  $U_i = x_i H(M) + x_i H(t_i) + U_{i-1}$
  - (d)  $V_i = x_i H(M \| D_i)$
3. Set the following variables and output NEW-SIGNATURE:
  - (a) IDENTIFIER-LIST  $\leftarrow L_i$
  - (b) STATIC-PART  $\leftarrow U_i$
  - (c) DYNAMIC-PART  $\leftarrow V_i$
  - (d) NEW-SIGNATURE  $\leftarrow \langle \text{CERTIFICATE}, \text{IDENTIFIER-LIST}, \text{STATIC-PART}, \text{DYNAMIC-PART} \rangle$

**(B) VERIFY-CHAIN-SIGNATURE**

For clarity, we describe the verification procedure to be followed by  $I_{i+1}$ . This procedure takes as input the MESSAGE  $\langle M, D_i \rangle$ , the signature SIGNATURE and outputs TRUE or FALSE. The process can be described algorithmically:

1. Output FALSE if SIGNATURE or MESSAGE has an invalid structure otherwise extract the following:
  - (a)  $\langle M, D_i \rangle$  from MESSAGE
  - (b)  $C$  from CERTIFICATE of SIGNATURE
  - (c)  $L_i = \langle I_1, I_2, \dots, I_i \rangle$  from IDENTIFIER-LIST of SIGNATURE
  - (d)  $U_i$  from STATIC-PART of SIGNATURE
  - (e)  $V_i$  from DYNAMIC-PART of SIGNATURE
2. Output FALSE if any of the following checks fail otherwise output TRUE:
  - (a) Check that  $C$  is valid for the pair  $\langle M, I_1 \rangle$
  - (b) Check that the sequence  $L_i$  does not contain any duplicate elements.
  - (c) (i) Compute  $\langle t_1, t_2 \dots t_i \rangle$  using the algorithm  $t_0 \leftarrow \epsilon, t_j \leftarrow h(t_{j-1} \| h(I_j))$   
(ii) Check that  $e(U_i, P) \stackrel{?}{=} \prod_{r=1}^{r=i} e(H(M) + H(t_r), Y_r)$
  - (d) Check  $e(V_i, P) \stackrel{?}{=} e(H(M \| D_i), Y_i)$
  - (e) Check that  $M$  and  $D_i$  belong to the same agent (via the mutually authenticating property)

If the output of the VERIFY-CHAIN-SIGNATURE process is TRUE, it can be ascertained (up to the level of trust placed on the TTP) that the itinerary proclaimed by the agent is correct. Execution privileges should be granted to the agent only if  $I_{i+1}$  trusts the TTP and *all* the identities in the itinerary to a satisfactory level.  $I_{i+1}$  can still choose to transfer the agent further even after denying execution privileges. Notice that our signatures are very similar to the aggregate signatures of Boneh et al. [22].

## 4.4 Correctness and Soundness

To prove the correctness and soundness of our scheme, we must first formally define our security goals and our adversary model. We want to ensure that the ordered list of participants specified in IDENTIFIER-LIST should correctly and uniquely identify the path of the received message.

### (A) Correctness

We must show that if all the participants behave correctly, then the verification process will always succeed. The correctness of the verification process follows directly from the property of bilinear maps:

1. LHS of step 2(c) of verification process =  $e(U_i, P)$ 

$$= e(\sum_{r=1}^{r=i} x_r(H(M) + H(t_r)), P) = \prod_{r=1}^{r=i} e(x_r(H(M) + H(t_r)), P)$$

$$= \prod_{r=1}^{r=i} e(H(M) + H(t_r), x_r P) = \prod_{r=1}^{r=i} e(H(M) + H(t_r), Y_r)$$

$$= \text{RHS of step 2(c)}$$
2. LHS of step 2(d) of verification process =  $e(V_i, P)$ 

$$= e(x_i H(M || D_i), P) = e(H(M || D_i), x_i P)$$

$$= \text{RHS of step 2(d)}$$

### (B) Soundness

To prove soundness, we need to show that if any of the users misbehave, the verification will fail with a high probability. In other words, we must show that the scheme is existentially unforgeable with respect to the message  $M$  and each sequence  $L_i$  uniquely and correctly identifies the order of signers.

We note that the signatures  $V_i$  on the dynamic parts  $D_i$  are secure against existential forgery assuming the hardness of the BDHP as shown in [19]. The value  $D_i$  is authenticated only up to the previous hop, our security analysis of chained signatures is considered only with respect to the static part  $M$ . The mutually authenticating property ensures that static and dynamic parts from different agents cannot be mixed.

#### 1. Existential Unforgeability

We must show that our scheme is existentially unforgeable. In other words, it is not possible for any active adversary to forge signatures on any new (chosen) messages. This follows from the following theorem:

**Theorem 1** *Assume that  $H$  is a random oracle and the Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem (BDHP) in  $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$  is hard. Then our scheme is secure against existential forgery.*

**Proof:** We assume that the hash function  $H$  is a random oracle. Define a family of hash functions  $H_Z : \Sigma^* \mapsto \mathbb{G}_1$  as:  $H_Z(X) = H(X) + Z$  where  $Z \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_1$ . Each function  $H_Z$  also behaves like a random oracle. Let  $Z = H(M)$  and  $X = t_i$ .

In this notation, each  $U_i$  can be considered as an aggregation of individual signatures of  $I_j$  on  $t_j \forall j \leq i$  using the aggregate signature scheme of [22] and setting the hash function as  $H_{H(M)}$  for some known constant  $M$  because:  $U_i = \sum_{r=1}^{r=i} x_r(H(M) + H(t_r)) = \sum_{r=1}^{r=i} x_r H_{H(M)}(t_r)$ . Also since  $H$  is a random oracle, it is hard to find another value  $M_1 \neq M$  such that  $H(M) = H(M_1)$ .

Assuming that  $I_i \neq I_j$  whenever  $i \neq j$  and  $h(I_i) \neq \epsilon \forall i$ , it is also ensured that  $t_i \neq t_j$  whenever  $i \neq j$  (in other words, all  $t_i$  are distinct). It is shown in theorem 3.2 of [22] that this aggregate signature scheme is secure against existential forgery if the messages  $t_i$  are all distinct and the BDHP in  $(G_1, G_2)$  is hard. This completes the proof of security against existential forgery.

## 2. Chained Signature Unforgeability

To prove that our chained signature scheme is secure, it remains to be shown that each  $t_i \in \Sigma^l$  corresponds to the unique sequence  $L_i \in \langle \mathbb{I} \rangle$  or alternatively the pairs  $\langle t_i, L_i \rangle$  are fixed since otherwise an attacker might be able to delete or change order of some identities in the list. Our proof is based on the hardness of inverting the hash function  $h$ . Recall that the range of  $h$  is  $\Sigma^l$ , the set strings all strings over  $\Sigma$  of length  $\leq l$ . Before we proceed, we need the following result:

**Theorem 2** *For any random string  $a \in \Sigma^*$ , if there is an oracle  $\mathcal{Q}$  that can compute two strings  $u, v \in \Sigma^*$  such that  $a = (u \| h(v))$  and the length of  $h(v)$  is uniformly chosen between 1 and  $k$  for some  $k \leq l$  then  $h$  can be inverted for at least  $2^k$  instances with non-negligible probability.*

**Proof:** Let  $b$  be a random string of at most  $k$  bits. We will use the oracle to invert  $h$  by finding a value  $c$  such that  $b = h(c)$ . Construct the string  $a = ("1" \| b)$ . The string  $a$  is given repeatedly as input to the oracle which will return different values of  $\langle u, v \rangle$  for each query such that length of  $h(v)$  is uniformly chosen between 1 and  $k$  and is independent of previous queries. For any query,  $\Pr[h(v) \neq b] = \frac{k-1}{k}$  and is independent of other queries. Thus, after  $n$  queries,  $\Pr[h(v) \neq b \forall n] = (\frac{k-1}{k})^n$  and this value can be made extremely low by choosing large enough  $n$ . On the other hand, if  $h(v) = b$  then we have inverted  $h$  and found a value  $c = v$  such that  $b = h(c)$ , thus completing the proof.

**Corollary 1:** If  $h$  is non-invertible for all instances then such an oracle  $\mathcal{Q}$  cannot exist.

Assume that there is an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  who is able to compute a sequence  $L_{\mathcal{A}} \in \langle \mathbb{I} \rangle$  such that  $L_{\mathcal{A}} \neq L_i$  but  $t_i$  corresponds to  $L_{\mathcal{A}}$ . Also let  $L_{\mathcal{A}} = \langle I_{\alpha_1}, I_{\alpha_2}, \dots, I_{\alpha_j} \rangle$  and  $L_i = \langle I_1, I_2, \dots, I_i \rangle$ . A successful attack by  $\mathcal{A}$  will imply that  $h(t_{\alpha_{j-1}} \| h(I_{\alpha_j})) = h(t_{i-1} \| h(I_i))$ . Since  $h$  is a random oracle and is collision resistant, we will trivially assume that  $(t_{\alpha_{j-1}} \| h(I_{\alpha_j})) = (t_{i-1} \| h(I_i))$  which leads to the following two possibilities:

1.  $I_{\alpha_j} \neq I_i$  and  $t_{\alpha_{j-1}} \neq t_{i-1}$
2.  $I_{\alpha_j} = I_i$  and  $t_{\alpha_{j-1}} = t_{i-1}$

The first possibility is ruled out due to corollary 1 since otherwise, we can simulate a call to the oracle  $\mathcal{Q}$  by challenging  $\mathcal{A}$  with the value  $a = (t_{i-1} \| h(I_i))$ . We will therefore only consider the second possibility in our analysis.

From the second possibility,  $t_{\alpha_{j-1}} = t_{i-1}$  or alternatively,  $h(t_{\alpha_{j-2}} \| h(I_{\alpha_{j-1}})) = h(t_{i-2} \| h(I_{i-1}))$ . Using the induction hypothesis and the above analogy, we see that one of the following must hold:

1.  $i > j$ . Therefore  $h(h(I_{\alpha_1})) = h(t_{i-j} \| h(I_{i-j+1}))$  and  $t_{i-j} \neq \epsilon$   
Assume that  $h$  is a random oracle and collision resistant. We then have,  $h(I_{\alpha_1}) = (t_{i-j} \| h(I_{i-j+1}))$ . Alternatively,  $I_{\alpha_1} = h^{-1}(t_{i-j} \| h(I_{i-j+1}))$ . Computing such an  $I_{\alpha_1}$  requires the ability to invert  $h$  so this case is ruled out.
2.  $i < j$ . Therefore  $h(t_{\alpha_{j-i}} \| h(I_{\alpha_{j-1+i}})) = h(h(I_1))$  and  $t_{\alpha_{j-i}} \neq \epsilon$ .  
Assume that  $h$  is collision resistant and thus,  $h(I_1) = (t_{\alpha_{j-i}} \| h(I_{\alpha_{j-1+i}}))$ . Setting  $a = h(I_1)$ , we see from theorem 2 and corollary 1 that computing such an  $I_{\alpha_{j-1+i}}$  is not feasible and hence this case is also ruled out.
3.  $i = j$ . Therefore  $I_{\alpha_i} = I_i$  and  $t_{\alpha_i} = t_i \forall i$   
Alternatively this implies that  $L_{\mathcal{A}} = L_i$ . This is a contradiction to our assumption that  $L_{\mathcal{A}} \neq L_i$  and therefore such an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  cannot exist. This completes our proof of security.

## 5 Overview of the protocol

The above protocol is an example of a one-way signature chaining scheme. To understand this, see that step 7 of the verification process involves the public keys of all participating users (in the right order). Moreover, since  $M$  and  $I_1$  cannot be unlinked due to the certificate  $C$ , it is ensured that a different initial user cannot be used for  $M$ .

We see that the signatures have an “additive” property, demonstrated by the fact that  $I_{i+1}$  can ‘add’ more information to the signature  $U_i$  of  $I_i$  by computing  $U_{i+1}$ . Note that computing any  $U_i$  just from

$U_{i+1}$  is considered infeasible due to the assumed properties of the bilinear map.<sup>6</sup> User  $I_{i+1}$  sends  $U_{i+1}$  as part of the new signature while it keeps  $U_i$  from the old (received) signature as its secret evidence in case of a dispute. Non-repudiation is provided as follows: (Note that  $I_{i+1}$  must have saved the entire signature of  $I_i$ ).  $I_{i+1}$  can prove in a court that the message was indeed received from  $I_i$  by producing this signature as a *witness* and invoking the **VERIFY-CHAIN-SIGNATURE** procedure. Assuming that all users are unique, a few points about this protocol are noteworthy:

1. Each  $I_i$  who passes the message must include its name in the signature and in the right sequence for validation to succeed.
2. Users cannot remove names of other users from the list in the signature without knowledge of their private keys, nor can they change the order or add new names.
3. The dynamic part is only authenticated to the previous hop. The itinerary authentication is done entirely using the static part. Also, authentication is relative to  $I_1$  who in turn authenticates with the TTP. If, however, it is possible to establish the originator of a message directly from its contents or by some other means, the TTP can be eliminated. For a discussion on this see [9].
4. The signing and verification procedures are completely non-interactive. Moreover, it is possible to combine the signing and verifying procedures into a single *sign-verify* procedure to increase efficiency. However, there will always be a temporal ordering with verification and signing in our mobile agent scenario (corresponding to before and after the execution of the mobile agent).
5. The signing process requires two multiplications and one addition in  $\mathbb{G}_1$ . The verification process requires  $\mathcal{O}(n)$  multiplications in  $\mathbb{G}_2$  and  $\mathcal{O}(n)$  pairing computations. It is easily seen that the signing time is independent of the number of users. Also, the signature size is constant ignoring the payload of the identifier list (which cannot be avoided).

Our protocol demonstrates a type of chaining called *backward* chaining where each receiver of the message is responsible for “adding” a link to the chain. Likewise, we can also consider *forward* chaining where the senders of the message are responsible for creating the chain. In this variant, each sender is aware of the next receiver during the signing process. Forward chaining has the advantage that the order of participants can be strictly specified by senders. However, such a scheme also restricts the flexibility of the system because the message will have to be signed multiple times if sent to many receivers in parallel. Moreover in a backward chaining scheme, multiple senders within a ‘trust zone’ can use a single signing gateway without revealing the identity of the recipients. Due to these reasons, we only considered backward chaining in our work.<sup>7</sup>

## 6 Other Applications of Signature Chaining

In this section, we list several applications of signature chaining. If we consider the message without the dynamic part, we get a simple signature-chaining protocol for message passing, with the message being  $M$ , the static part. For all the applications discussed in this session, we assume that **MESSAGE** is simply the static part and the signing and verification procedures and the signature structure are accordingly modified to exclude all references to the dynamic part (in other words, steps 2(d) and 3(c) of the signing process and steps 1(e), 2(d) and 2(e) of the verification process are excluded).

Considering that one-way signature chaining enables us to correctly validate the path of any received message and provides non-repudiation, we can consider several applications: electronic auctions, payment systems [31], group e-commerce (e-commerce transactions where multiple entities are involved such that direct interaction is not possible between many of them), electronic work-flow enforcement (ensuring the order in which participants should be involved), ‘secret-passing’ protocols, secure routing, authenticated mail relaying and spam tracing, token based authentication, IP tracing, mobile IP, intrusion detection, GRID computing, battlefield modeling, Supply Chain Management, distributed systems and wireless roaming.

<sup>6</sup>Observe that  $U_i$  cannot be computed from  $U_{i+1}$  without knowledge of  $x_i$  but knowledge of  $U_i$  does not reveal  $x_i$ .

<sup>7</sup>Forward chaining is easy to construct but inefficient in practice. Each signer  $I_i$  simply signs the value  $(M||I_{i+1})$  using any ordinary digital signature scheme. The chained-signatures of  $I_i$  is the set of signature of all the previous signers including this signature.

## 7 Conclusion and Future Directions

In this paper, we proposed an authentication protocol for mobile agents based on bilinear pairings over elliptic curves. Our method is based on the notion of additive zero knowledge [9] which enables trust to propagate between different provers. We demonstrated that signature chaining can be used to form ad-hoc trust relationships between multiple participants in a dynamic and non-interactive manner. Our protocol can be used to authenticate the itinerary of mobile agents without any active involvement of a Trusted Third Party (TTP). It may be possible to completely eliminate the TTP using methods of code obfuscation, watermarking and undetachable signatures.

Our protocol uses a standard certificate-based PKI and it is worth researching if a certificate-less or an identity based scheme can be derived from the certificate based one presented in this paper. The other aspect of the paper described the concept of agent partitioning (section 2.1). It is an open question if a secure and ideal partitioning scheme can be constructed for mobile agents. However, it seems plausible considering the recent developments in java bytecode verifiers [32, 33, 34, 35, 36].

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