Paper 2005/269

Security Weakness in a Three-Party Password-Based Key Exchange Protocol Using Weil Pairing

Junghyun Nam, Seungjoo Kim, and Dongho Won

Abstract

Recently, Wen, Lee, and Hwang proposed a three-party password-authenticated key exchange protocol making use of the Weil pairing. The protocol was claimed to be provably secure. But despite the claim of provable security, the protocol is in fact insecure in the presence of an active adversary. We demonstrate this by presenting an attack that completely compromises the authentication mechanism of the protocol. Consequently, the proof of security for the protocol is invalidated.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Key exchange protocolpassword-based authenticationWeil pairing.
Contact author(s)
jhnam @ dosan skku ac kr
History
2005-08-17: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2005/269
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/269,
      author = {Junghyun Nam and Seungjoo Kim and Dongho Won},
      title = {Security Weakness in a Three-Party Password-Based Key Exchange Protocol Using Weil Pairing},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2005/269},
      year = {2005},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/269}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/269}
}
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