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Paper 2005/240
Attack on Okamoto et al.'s New Short Signature Schemes
Fangguo Zhang and Xiaofeng Chen
Abstract
We present an attack on a new short signature scheme from bilinear pairing proposed by Okamoto $et$ $al.$ at ITCC'05. We show that any one can derive the secret key of the signer from any two message-signature pairs and so can forge the signer's signature for any message. This means the scheme is totally broken.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- PDF PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. 2005 China National Computer Conference
- Keywords
- Short SignatureBilinear PairingAttack
- Contact author(s)
- isdzhfg @ zsu edu cn
- History
- 2005-07-30: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2005/240
- License
-
CC BY