Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2005/201

On Security Proof of McCullagh-Barreto's Key Agreement Protocol and its Variants

Zhaohui Cheng and Liqun Chen

Abstract: McCullagh and Barreto presented an identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol in CT-RSA 2005. Their protocol was found to be vulnerable to a key-compromise impersonation attack. In order to recover the weakness, McCullagh and Barreto, and Xie proposed two variants of the protocol respectively. In each of these works, a security proof of the proposed protocol was presented. In this paper, we revisit these three security proofs and show that all the reductions in these proofs are invalid, because the property of indistinguishability between their simulation and the real world was not held. As a replacement, we slightly modify the McCullagh and Barreto's second protocol and then formally analyse the security of the modified scheme in the Bellare-Rogaway key agreement model.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / identity-based key agreement, pairing

Publication Info: To appear in IJSN special issue on cryptography in networks

Date: received 28 Jun 2005, last revised 23 Aug 2006

Contact author: m z cheng at mdx ac uk

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: A complete proof presented.

Version: 20060823:114131 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2005/201

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