Security Proof of "Efficient and Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Transport Protocol Based on RSA"

SeongHan Shin; Kazukuni Kobara; Hideki Imai

Paper 2005/190

Security Proof of "Efficient and Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Transport Protocol Based on RSA"

SeongHan Shin, Kazukuni Kobara, and Hideki Imai

Abstract

In this paper, we prove the security of the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol \cite{SKI05} in the random oracle model. The proof states that the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol is secure against an adversary who gets the client's stored secret \emph{or} the server's RSA private key.\footnote{The protocol is the same as \cite{SKI05}, but we corrected the security proof partially. The attacks appeared in \cite{TM05} are no longer available in the proof since the adversary has access to either the client's stored secret or the server's private key, not both of them.} To our best knowledge, the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol is the most efficient among their kinds (i.e., RSA and password based AKE protocols). The other security properties and efficiency measurements of the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol remain the same as in \cite{SKI05}.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: authentication key transport protocol password on-line and off-line attacks
Contact author(s): seonghan shin @ aist go jp
History: 2006-05-15: revised; 2005-06-23: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2005/190
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/190,
      author = {SeongHan Shin and Kazukuni Kobara and Hideki Imai},
      title = {Security Proof of "Efficient and Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Transport Protocol Based on {RSA}"},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/190},
      year = {2005},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/190}
}