Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2005/190

Security Proof of "Efficient and Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Transport Protocol Based on RSA"

SeongHan Shin and Kazukuni Kobara and Hideki Imai

Abstract: In this paper, we prove the security of the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol \cite{SKI05} in the random oracle model. The proof states that the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol is secure against an adversary who gets the client's stored secret \emph{or} the server's RSA private key.\footnote{The protocol is the same as \cite{SKI05}, but we corrected the security proof partially. The attacks appeared in \cite{TM05} are no longer available in the proof since the adversary has access to either the client's stored secret or the server's private key, not both of them.}

To our best knowledge, the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol is the most efficient among their kinds (i.e., RSA and password based AKE protocols). The other security properties and efficiency measurements of the {\sf RSA-AKE} protocol remain the same as in \cite{SKI05}.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / authentication, key transport protocol, password, on-line and off-line attacks

Date: received 23 Jun 2005, last revised 15 May 2006

Contact author: seonghan shin at aist go jp

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20060515:203323 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2005/190

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