## Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2005/106

How To Play Almost Any Mental Game Over The Net --- Concurrent Composition via Super-Polynomial Simulation

Boaz Barak and Amit Sahai

Abstract: We construct a secure protocol for any multi-party functionality that remains secure (under a relaxed definition of security) when executed concurrently with multiple copies of itself and other protocols. We stress that we do *not* use any assumptions on existence of trusted parties, common reference string, honest majority or synchronicity of the network. The relaxation of security, introduced by Prabhakaran and Sahai (STOC '04), is obtained by allowing the ideal-model simulator to run in *quai-polynomial* (as opposed to polynomial) time. Quasi-polynomial simulation suffices to ensure security for most applications of multi-party computation. Furthermore, Lindell (FOCS '03, TCC' 04) recently showed that such a protocol is *impossible* to obtain under the more standard definition of *polynomial-time* simulation by an ideal adversary.

Our construction is the first such protocol under reasonably standard cryptographic assumptions. That is, existence of a hash function collection that is collision resistent with respect to circuits of subexponential size, and existence of trapdoor permutations that are secure with respect to circuits of quasi-polynomial size.

We introduce a new technique: protocol condensing''. That is, taking a protocol that has strong security properties but requires *super-polynomial* communication and computation, and then transforming it into a protocol with *polynomial* communication and computation, that still inherits the strong security properties of the original protocol. Our result is obtained by combining this technique with previous techniques of Canetti, Lindell, Ostrovsky, and Sahai (STOC '02) and Pass (STOC '04).

Category / Keywords: Non-malleable protocols, concurrent composition, multi-party secure computation

Publication Info: FOCS 2005

Date: received 10 Apr 2005, last revised 26 Aug 2005

Contact author: boaz at cs princeton edu

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Improved introduction and other rewrites. No change in technical content from previous version.

Short URL: ia.cr/2005/106

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]