Paper 2005/081

Smashing SMASH

Norbert Pramstaller, Christian Rechberger, and Vincent Rijmen

Abstract

We present a collision attack on the recently proposed hash function SMASH. The attack uses negligible resources and we conjecture that it works for all hash functions built following the design method of SMASH.

Note: Paper withdrawn because it is accepted at SAC 2005.

Metadata
Available format(s)
-- withdrawn --
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. paper accepted at SAC 2005
Keywords
hash functions
Contact author(s)
vincent rijmen @ iaik tugraz at
History
2005-07-04: withdrawn
2005-03-17: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2005/081
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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