Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2004/345
On Session Identifiers in Provably Secure Protocols: The Bellare-Rogaway Three-Party Key Distribution Protocol Revisited
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo and Colin Boyd and Yvonne Hitchcock and Greg Maitland
Abstract: We examine the role of session identifiers (SIDs) in security proofs for key establishment protocols. After reviewing the practical importance of SIDs we use as a case study the three-party server-based key distribution (3PKD) protocol of Bellare and Rogaway, proven secure in 1995. We show incidentally that the partnership function used in the existing security proof is flawed. There seems to be no way to define a SID for the 3PKD protocol that will preserve the proof of security. A small change to the protocol allows a natural definition for a SID and we prove that the new
protocol is secure using this SID to define partnering.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols /
Publication Info: This is the full version of the conference proceedings that appears in 4th Conference on Security in Communication Networks - SCN 2004, volume 3352/2005 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 352--367, Springer-Verlag.
Date: received 7 Dec 2004
Contact author: k choo at qut edu au
Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20041211:055102 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2004/345
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