Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs and the Security of Triple Encryption

Mihir Bellare; Phillip Rogaway

Paper 2004/331

Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs and the Security of Triple Encryption

Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway

Abstract

The game-playing technique is a powerful tool for analyzing cryptographic constructions. We illustrate this by using games as the central tool for proving security of three-key triple-encryption, a long-standing open problem. Our result, which is in the ideal-cipher model, demonstrates that for DES parameters (56-bit keys and 64-bit plaintexts) an adversary's maximal advantage is small until it asks about $2^{78}$ queries. Beyond this application, we develop the foundations for game playing, formalizing a general framework for game-playing proofs and discussing techniques used within such proofs. To further exercise the game-playing framework we show how to use games to get simple proofs for the PRP/PRF Switching Lemma, the security of the basic CBC~MAC, and the chosen-plaintext-attack security of OAEP.

Note: An earlier version of this paper was entitled "The Game-Playing Technique." The current version is substantially different.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: Cryptographic analysis techniques
Contact author(s): mihir @ cs ucsd edu
History: 2008-11-29: last of 16 revisions; 2004-11-30: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2004/331
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/331,
      author = {Mihir Bellare and Phillip Rogaway},
      title = {Code-Based Game-Playing Proofs and the Security of Triple Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/331},
      year = {2004},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/331}
}