Paper 2004/269
Cryptanalysis of Threshold-Multisignature Schemes
Lifeng Guo
Abstract
In [1], Li et al. proposed a new type of signature scheme, called the $(t,n)$ threshold-mutisignature scheme. The first one needs a mutually trusted share distribution center (SDC) while the second one does not. In this paper, we present a security analysis on their second schemes. We point out that their second threshold-multisignature scheme is vulnerable to universal forgery by an insider attacker under reasonable assumptions. In our attack, $(n-t+1)$ colluding members can control the group secret key. Therefore, they can generate valid threshold-multisignautre for any message without the help of other members. Furthermore, honest members cannot detect this security flaw in the system, since any $t$ members can generate threshold-multisignatures according to the prescribed protocols.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- threshold-multisignaturesecret sharing
- Contact author(s)
- lfguo @ mail cstnet cn
- History
- 2004-10-21: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/269
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/269,
author = {Lifeng Guo},
title = {Cryptanalysis of Threshold-Multisignature Schemes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/269},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/269}
}
