Paper 2004/233
Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange in the Three-Party Setting
Michel Abdalla, Pierre-Alain Fouque, and David Pointcheval
Abstract
Password-based authenticated key exchange are protocols which are designed to be secure even when the secret key or password shared between two users is drawn from a small set of values. Due to the low entropy of passwords, such protocols are always subject to on-line guessing attacks. In these attacks, the adversary may succeed with non-negligible probability by guessing the password shared between two users during its on-line attempt to impersonate one of these users. The main goal of password-based authenticated key exchange protocols is to restrict the adversary to this case only. In this paper, we consider password-based authenticated key exchange in the three-party scenario, in which the users trying to establish a secret do not share a password between themselves but only with a trusted server. Towards our goal, we recall some of the existing security notions for password-based authenticated key exchange protocols and introduce new ones that are more suitable to the case of generic constructions. We then present a natural generic construction of a three-party protocol, based on any two-party authenticated key exchange protocol, and prove its security without making use of the Random Oracle model. To the best of our knowledge, the new protocol is the first provably-secure password-based protocol in the three-party setting.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Passwordauthenticated key exchangekey distributionmulti-party protocols.
- Contact author(s)
- Michel Abdalla @ ens fr
- History
- 2004-09-13: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/233
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/233,
author = {Michel Abdalla and Pierre-Alain Fouque and David Pointcheval},
title = {Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange in the Three-Party Setting},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/233},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/233}
}
