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Paper 2004/232

Extending the Resynchronization Attack

Frederik Armknecht and Joseph Lano and Bart Preneel

Abstract

Synchronous stream ciphers need perfect synchronization between sender and receiver. In practical applications, this is ensured by a resync mechanism. Daemen et al first described attacks on ciphers using such a resync mechanism. In this paper, we extend their attacks in several ways by combining the standard attack with several cryptanalytic techniques such as algebraic attacks and linear cryptanalysis. Our results show that using linear resync mechanisms should be avoided, and give lower bounds for the nonlinearity required from a secure resync mechanism.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF PS
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Extended version of the paper that will appear under the same title in the proceedings of SAC 2004
Keywords
stream cipherscryptanalysis
Contact author(s)
joseph lano @ esat kuleuven ac be
History
2004-09-20: revised
2004-09-13: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2004/232
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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