Paper 2004/232
Extending the Resynchronization Attack
Frederik Armknecht, Joseph Lano, and Bart Preneel
Abstract
Synchronous stream ciphers need perfect synchronization between sender and receiver. In practical applications, this is ensured by a resync mechanism. Daemen et al first described attacks on ciphers using such a resync mechanism. In this paper, we extend their attacks in several ways by combining the standard attack with several cryptanalytic techniques such as algebraic attacks and linear cryptanalysis. Our results show that using linear resync mechanisms should be avoided, and give lower bounds for the nonlinearity required from a secure resync mechanism.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
PS
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Extended version of the paper that will appear under the same title in the proceedings of SAC 2004
- Keywords
- stream cipherscryptanalysis
- Contact author(s)
- joseph lano @ esat kuleuven ac be
- History
- 2004-09-20: revised
- 2004-09-13: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2004/232
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2004/232,
author = {Frederik Armknecht and Joseph Lano and Bart Preneel},
title = {Extending the Resynchronization Attack},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2004/232},
year = {2004},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/232}
}
