Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2004/219

Entropic Security and the Encryption of High Entropy Messages

Yevgeniy Dodis and Adam Smith

Abstract: Russell and Wang (Eurocrypt 2002) recently introduced an elegant, information-theoretic notion called entropic security of encryption: they required that the cipher text leak no predicate of the plaintext (similar to semantic security (Goldwasser and Micali, JCSS 1984)) but only as long as the distribution on messages has high entropy from the adversary's point of view. They show that this notion of security can be achieved with very short keys for entropically rich message spaces. Canetti, Miccianci and Reingold (STOC, 1998) had previously constructed hash functions which satisfy a similar entropic security condition. The output of such hash function leaks no partial information about the input, provided the input has sufficiently high entropy. This paper studies entropic security in general, and its application to the encryption of high-entropy messages.

(1) We elucidate the notion of entropic security. Our results apply to all entropically-secure primitives, including both encryption and hash functions. We strengthen the formulation of Canetti and Russell and Wang: we require that an entropically-secure primitive leak no function whasoever of its input, while the previous works focus only on predicates. This stronger formulation is much closer to the original notion of semantic security. We also show that entropic security is equivalent to indistinguishability on pairs of input distributions of sufficiently high entropy. This equivalence generalizes the conventional equivalence between indistinguishability and semantic security. Indistinguishability, in turn, is related to randomness extraction from non-uniform distributions. The proof of the equivalence of hiding predicates to hiding all functions is quite involved, and requires very different techniques from those of Goldwasser and Micali.

(2) We use the equivalence above, and the connection to randomness extraction, to prove several new results on entropically-secure encryption. We obtain:

(a) Two general frameworks for constructing entropically secure encryption schemes, one based on expander graphs and the other on XOR-universal hash functions. These schemes generalize the schemes of Russell and Wang, yielding simpler constructions and proofs as well as improved parameters. The best scheme uses a key of length k=n-t+2log(1/eps)+O(1), where eps is a measure of leakage and t is the initial min-entropy of the message.

(b) Lower bounds on the key length k for entropic security and indistinguishability. In particular, we show near tightness of Russell-Wang constructions: k > n-t. (In fact, for a large class of schemes k >= n-t + log(1/eps).)

Category / Keywords: foundations / encryption, entropic security, randomness extractors, information theory, secret-key cryptography, small-bias sets

Publication Info: Unpublished. Appears as part of second author's Ph.D. thesis (MIT, 2004).

Date: received 1 Sep 2004, last revised 1 Sep 2004

Contact author: asmith at theory csail mit edu

Available format(s): Postscript (PS) | Compressed Postscript (PS.GZ) | PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20040901:131955 (All versions of this report)

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]