Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2004/205
Direct Anonymous Attestation
Ernie Brickell and Jan Camenisch and Liqun Chen
Abstract: This paper describes the direct anonymous attestation scheme (DAA). This scheme was adopted by the Trusted Computing Group as the method for remote authentication of a hardware module, called trusted platform module (TPM), while preserving the privacy of the user of the platform that contains the module. Direct anonymous attestation can be seen as a group signature without the feature that a signature can be opened, i.e., the anonymity is not revocable.
Moreover, DAA allows for pseudonyms, i.e., for each signature a user (in agreement with the recipient of the signature) can decide whether or not the signature should be linkable to another signature. DAA furthermore allows for detection of ``known'' keys: if the DAA secret keys are extracted from a TPM and published, a verifier can detect that a signature was produced using these secret keys. The scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model under the strong RSA and the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / digital signatures, privacy, group signatures
Publication Info: Full version of ACM CCS 04 paper.
Date: received 20 Aug 2004
Contact author: jca at zurich ibm com
Available formats: PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20040821:115324 (All versions of this report)
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